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Upcoming Courses
Advanced	 Police	 Training
Advanced training  provides opportunities for skill 
development and career enhancement for 
municipal police officers. Training  is offered in 
the areas of investigation, patrol operations and 
leadership for in-service municipal and RCMP 
police officers.
JIBC	 Police	 Academy
See Course List here.
Graduate Certificates
Intelligence Analysis
or 
Tactical Criminal Analysis
www.jibc.ca
BCACP/CACP
2015	 Police	 Leadership	 Conference
April	 12-14,	 2015
“Leading	 with	 Vision	 and	 Values”
This is Canada's largest police leadership 
conference providing  an opportunity for delegates 
to hear leadership  topics discussed by world-
renowned speakers. Click here
see 
page  
36
BCLEDN	 Conference
November	 5,	 2014
“Radicalization	 of	 Terrorists”	 
see 
page 
4
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WHAT’S	 NEW	 FOR	 POLICE	 IN	 
THE	 LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
most recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Children at risk: the case for a better response to 
parental addiction.
Representative for Children and Youth.
Victoria, BC: Representative for Children and Youth, 
(2014).
HV 746 B7 T87 2014
Crucial accountability:  tools for resolving 
violated expectations, broken commitments, and 
bad behavior.
Kerry Patterson, Joseph Grenny, David Maxfield, Ron 
McMillan, and Al Switzler.
New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, (2013).
HM 1121 C78 2013
Doing action research in your own organization.
David Coghlan & Teresa Brannick.
Los Angeles, CA: SAGE, (2014).
H 62 C5647 2014
Happiness matters [videorecording]:  creating  a 
culture for business to thrive.
Tony Hsieh; production services provided by 
Stanford Video; director, Gordon Gurley.
Mill Valley, CA : Kantola Productions, (2011).
1 videodisc (63 min.): sd., color; 4 3/4 in. (DVD).
"Can you build a  business model around happiness? 
If you can deliver happiness to customers through 
exceptional customer service, from engaged  
employees who are inspired by a vision of higher 
purpose, the answer is yes. In this high-spirited talk, 
Tony Hsieh shares how Zappos fosters its unique 
culture, starting  with hiring  and retaining  employees 
based on their commitment to its core values."- Back 
cover.
HF 5386 H75 2011 D1996
How to be an even better manager: a complete 
A-Z of proven techniques and essential skills.
Michael Armstrong.
London, U.K.: Kogan Page, (2014).
HD 31 A73 2014
It starts with one: changing  individuals changes 
organizations.
J. Stewart Black.
Indianapolis, IN: Pearson, (2014).
HD 58.8 B547 2014
Leadership and the one minute manager: 
increasing  effectiveness through situational 
leadership® II.
Ken Blanchard, Patricia Zigarmi, Drea  Zigarmi.
New York, NY: William Morrow (2013).
HD 57.7 B56 2013
No accident:  eliminating  injury and death  on 
Canadian roads.
Neil Arason; foreword by Ralph Nader.
Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University, (2014).
HE 5614.5 C2 A67 2014
Reframing  organizations:  artistry, choice, and 
leadership.
Lee G. Bolman, Terrence E. Deal.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, (2013).
HD 31 B636 2013
What color is your parachute?:  a practical  manual 
for job-hunters and career-changers.
Richard N. Bolles.
Berkeley, CA: Ten Speed Press (2014).
HF 5383 B56 2014
Winning from within:  a breakthrough method for 
leading, living and lasting change.
Erica Ariel Fox.
New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers, (2013).
HD 57.7 F69 2013
Women on ice:  methamphetamine use among 
suburban women.
Miriam Boeri.
New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, (2013).
HV 5824 W6 W64 2013
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BCLEDN
BC Law En forcement D ivers i t y Net work
Nov. 5th, 2014 from 9am to 4pm @ The Justice Institute of BC
Registration from 8am to 8:45am • Pre-register at www.bcledn.org 
$175 (before or on Sept 30) and $225 (after September 30)
Attendance Restricted to Law Enforcement Personnel Only
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Dr. Martin Bouchard
Associate Professor of 
Criminology & Director of 
the International Cyber 
Crime Research Centre 
(SFU) and Associate 
Director of Research of 
TSAS. Bouchard will present 
on the role of social 
networks connected to 
illegal markets, organized 
crime & more specifically, 
terrorism.
Dr. Lorne L. Dawson
Chair of the Department 
of Sociology and Legal 
Studies at the University 
of Waterloo and Professor 
in the Department of 
Sociology and Legal 
Studies and Department 
of Religious Studies. 
Dawson will discuss the 
process of radicalization 
in homegrown terrorists 
groups. 
Mubin Shaikh
Coming from a 
background of having 
been a Muslim extremist in 
earlier years to becoming 
an undercover operative 
in several high profile 
classified cases. Shaikh 
will provide an extremely 
unique perspective 
on radicalization and 
recruitment as it relates to 
society today.
Insp. Steve Corcoran  
Operations Officer for 
the E Division National 
Security Enforcement 
Team (INSET) and active 
member of the National 
Security Program for 
over 11 years. Corcoran 
brings a local and 
front-line perspective on 
homegrown terrorism and 
radicalization.
The BC LEDN is a sub-committee of the British Columbia Association of Chiefs of Police with representation from the following participating agencies.
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JUSTIFICATION	 FOR	 NIGHT	 
SEARCH	 UPHELD:	 
NO	 CHARTER	 BREACH
R. v. L.V.R., 2014 BCCA 349
Following  an investigation involving 
sexual offences against two youths, 
the accused was arrested.  While he 
was in custody, police sought a 
warrant to search his home during 
the night for a number of things including  computers 
and devices capable  of storing  or recording  digital 
photographs, hard copy photographs, and firearms 
and weapons. The  reasons the officer provided in the 
grounds for the ITO to justify a night search were:
• The accused was in custody for a court 
appearance and the evidence  sought was 
required prior to his appearance;
• There were police officers maintaining 
continuity of the residence; and
• The officer was working  her last night shift and 
would not be available for a  few days. During 
this time there would be an opportunity for the 
loss of evidence if the search warrant was not 
executed before the accused’s release  from 
custody.
Furthermore, the justice of the peace was informed 
the house would be empty during  the proposed 
hours of the search. The search warrant was granted 
setting  the hours for search as 11:35 pm to 5:30 am. 
During  the search the police seized the accused’s 
computer and various storage devices containing  a 
number of photographs of a  naked female, and a 
video of a male and female having  sexual 
intercourse.  Charges were laid including  several 
related to sexual offences.
British Columbia Supreme Court
During  a voir dire the officer testified, in 
part, that she believed the accused would 
go before a judge within 24 hours of his 
arrest and might be released. She feared 
that upon release he would remove or destroy 
evidence. The accused maintained that all of the 
evidence seized under the warrant should be ruled 
inadmissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter because 
the search of his house and the seizure of the 
evidence violated his rights under s. 8 of the Charter. 
He argued, among  other things, that the ITO did not 
meet the statutory requirements under s. 488 of the 
Criminal Code justifying a night search.
The judge, however, noted the issuing  justice was 
aware that the house would be vacant and police 
did not rouse residents in the middle of the night 
when executing  the search warrant. The judge 
concluded there were reasonable grounds for a night 
search, referring  to three factors in upholding  the 
search warrant - (1)  the evidence was capable of 
being  quickly destroyed, (2)  the matter was very 
serious, and (3) it was certain that there would be no 
one home when the search warrant was executed. 
The evidence was admitted and the accused was 
convicted of several offences.
“What is 
reasonable 
depends on all the 
circumstances. It is 
a practical, 
common-sense 
question.”
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British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the trial 
judge erred in finding  a valid basis 
for the  night search. Under s. 488 
of the Criminal Code, a s. 487 or s. 
487.1 search warrant may only be executed by day 
unless the justice is satisfied that there  are 
reasonable grounds for it to be executed by night, 
the reasonable grounds are included in the ITO, and 
the warrant authorizes that it be executed by night. 
The accused submitted that he would not have been 
released from custody before morning. Therefore, 
there  was no realistic concern or threat he could 
destroy evidence. The police, after all, were 
watching  his house  and maintaining  continuity of it. 
In his view, having  to maintain continuity of a 
residence was not sufficient reason for a night search 
because  it was only related to police convenience. 
Nor did the officer’s un-availability due to being  off 
shift serve as a valid basis for authorizing  the night 
search because the officer did not have to take part 
in the execution of the warrant.
Justice Saunders, writing  the Court of Appeal’s 
opinion, agreed that “the officer’s future  availability 
to search the premises generally would not rise to a 
reasonable ground for a  night search in 
circumstances in which a co-investigator is, 
presumably, capable of conducting  a search.” 
Maintaining  continuity of the residence and concern 
as to the timing  of the  accused’s release, however, 
related to the officer’s concern for preservation of 
evidence, a concern that could provide a proper 
basis for a night search.
In deciding  whether there were reasonable grounds 
for the execution of the  search warrant at night, 
Justice Saunders stated:
What is reasonable depends on all the 
circumstances. It is a practical, common-sense 
question. Good faith on the part of the affiant is 
important in answering  this question, but 
subjective belief does not provide the whole 
answer. The criteria in s.  488  contains an 
objective aspect: in the circumstances known at 
the time the search warrant was issued, was it 
reasonable that the search warrant be executed 
at night?
Section 488  does not set “necessity” as the basis 
for a night search warrant, but rather engages the 
situational term “reasonable grounds”. A night 
search may be reasonable in one situation but 
not in another, depending upon a host of factors. 
The gravity of the substance of the investigation, 
the likely occupancy of the residence and 
degree of disruption to privacy the search may 
cause, the nature of the items that may be found 
in a search, and the needs of the investigation 
are but a few. [paras. 24-25]
BY THE BOOK:
Night	 Search: Criminal Code
s. 488   A warrant issued under section 487 or 
487.1 shall be executed by day, unless
(a) the justice is satisfied that there are 
reasonable grounds for it to be executed by 
night;
(b) the reasonable grounds are included in the information; 
and
(c) the warrant authorizes that it be executed by night.
“night” means the period between nine o’clock in the 
afternoon and six o’clock in the forenoon of the following 
day. (s. 2 Criminal Code) 
Night = 9 pm - 6 am
“Section 488 does not set ‘necessity’ as the basis for a night search warrant, but rather 
engages the situational term ‘reasonable grounds’. A night search may be reasonable in 
one situation but not in another, depending upon a host of factors.”
“The criteria in s. 488 contains an 
objective aspect: in the circumstances 
known at the time the search warrant 
was issued, was it reasonable that the 
search warrant be executed at night?”
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The trial judge did not err in upholding  the search 
warrant because of the three factors he identified (1) 
the fact that no-one was home during  the hours 
proposed for the search, (2)  the seriousness of the 
matters under investigation, and (3) the disposable 
nature of the items sought. “While  the police still 
required specific authorization to search at night 
(s.  488), the absence of any resident is highly 
relevant, and the judge was correct to consider the 
diminished degree to which privacy interests would 
be affected in the circumstances by a search at 
night,” said Justice Saunders. “Likewise, the 
ser iousness of the  of fence was a proper 
consideration.”
As for the  disposable nature of the items sought, 
there  were two relevant reasons given by the police 
officer in the ITO: (1)  the need for police to maintain 
continuity of the residence, and (2) the possibility 
the accused would be released:
The investigating officers considered that the 
items referred to in the search warrant were of 
sufficient importance to justify the continuing 
police presence to establish continuity, and the 
police officer completing the ITO correctly 
understood the burden on the police to bring 
[the accused] before the Provincial Court 
without delay. The officer had no way of 
knowing if and when [the accused] might have 
been released. In the event he was released he 
could be expected to travel immediately to his 
residence, risking  destruction of items in the 
residence unless the police were present to 
prevent this from happening. All of this meant 
that the investigation required a continuing 
police presence at the residence until the search 
began. However, until it began the police 
officers securing the residence were effectively 
an idling  motor. Such idling might have been of 
no moment had the residence been occupied 
and had there been a real risk of rousing 
sleepers, but such was not the case. In my view, 
the relative waste in police personnel simply 
waiting for the crack of day, with no 
corresponding  benefit to any resident, is a factor 
supporting  the judge’s ruling. I  cannot say the 
judge erred in finding  the officer’s concern, 
when the ITO was sworn, provided reasonable 
grounds for a night search in all the 
circumstances. [para. 28]
The Court of Appeal rejected the accused’s 
submission that the search warrant was invalid in 
authorizing  a night search. His appeal was dismissed 
and his convictions were upheld. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
22-MINUTE	 ADVISEMENT	 DELAY	 
VIOLATED	 RIGHTS:	 
COCAINE	 EXCLUDED
R. v. Mian, 2014 SCC 54
P o l i c e i n E d m o n t o n w e r e 
investigating  a number of gang 
rela ted homicides and other 
violence. The investigative team 
obtained a wiretap  authorization 
that allowed the interception of the private 
communications of a principal target. One of the 
calls intercepted related to a drug  transaction for the 
purchase of a half kilogram of cocaine. Visual 
surveillance of the target revealed interactions with 
the accused who was driving  a grey Chevrolet 
Malibu and was believed to be the supplier of the 
cocaine. While surveillance was ongoing, a 
detective instructed other officers to make a routine 
traffic stop  of the  Malibu and to use  every effort to 
find appropriate grounds to search the car without 
having  to rely on the information provided by the 
detective so that the ongoing  homicide investigation 
would not be compromised. The officers were also 
told that there were already grounds to arrest the 
driver which could be relied upon if other grounds 
could not be found.
As the Malibu left a bar, it was pulled over and the 
accused was removed from the vehicle. He had a 
cell phone in his hand, which police removed and a 
pat‑down search revealed $2,710 in cash on his 
person. After he was secured in the back of a police 
car, the Malibu was search and cocaine, an 
additional $1,340 in cash, another cell phone and 
the accused’s wallet was found.  Some 22 minutes 
after the Malibu was pulled over, the accused was 
advised that he was being  arrested for possessing 
cocaine for the purposes of trafficking. Another two 
to five minutes passed before he was advised of his 
Charter right to retain and instruct counsel. The 
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accused was charged with possessing  cocaine for 
the purpose of trafficking  and possessing  currency 
obtained by the commission of an offence. 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused sought the exclusion of all 
the evidence under s. 24(2)  of the Charter. 
He argued he was arbitrarily detained and 
arrested, subjected to an unreasonable 
search and seizure, and not properly advised of the 
reason for his detention and of his right to counsel. 
Although the arresting  officers did not have grounds 
of their own to arrest the accused and conduct the 
searches, the judge found they could rely  on the 
grounds gathered by the detective and the 
surveillance team that the Malibu 
contained a  significant quantity of 
cocaine. Thus, the accused’s 
detention was not arbitrary and 
the searches of his person and 
vehicle  were lawful. However, 
the judge ruled that the accused’s 
s. 10  (a)  Charter  right to be 
informed promptly of the reasons 
therefor and his s. 10 (b)  right to be 
informed of his right to retain and 
instruct counsel without delay had been 
breached. In the judge’s view, there must be 
exceptional circumstances to justify suspending  the 
rights protected under s. 10 (a) and (b) which did not 
exist in this case. There was no satisfactory reason 
for not advising  the accused immediately of his 
rights on arrest and by waiting  22 minutes to inform 
him of the reason for his arrest and of his right to 
retain and instruct counsel. The evidence was then 
excluded under s. 24(2) and the accused was 
acquitted. 
Alberta Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the  accused’s 
acquittal. It argued that the trial 
judge erred by failing  to find 
exceptional circumstances justified 
the suspension of s. 10(a)  and (b)  rights and in 
excluding  the evidence under s. 24(2). The Court of 
Appeal, however, raised a different issue for 
consideration and ordered a  new trial on the basis 
that the  trial judge relied on impermissible 
cross examination - allowing  a police 
witness to be questioned about the 
veracity of evidence given by another 
officer. The Appeal Court found it 
inappropriate to engage in an 
analysis of the other grounds of 
appeal, including  the s. 10 Charter 
issues.
Supreme Court of Canada
The accused appealed the order of a new 
trial. The Supreme Court revisited the trial 
judges determination about whether there were 
breaches of s. 10 (a)  and (b) of 
the Charter as well as whether 
the trial judge erred in his 
analysis and decision to 
exclude the evidence.
The Crown suggested that the 22-minute delay  in 
complying  with the  informational duties under s. 10 
was justified by  exceptional circumstances. In the 
Crown’s view, a more transparent drug  arrest would 
have compromised the integrity  of the  separate and 
ongoing wiretap investigation into gang violence. 
But Justice Rothstein, speaking  for an unanimous 
Supreme Court, found there was no basis to overturn 
the trial judge’s conclusion that the accused’s s. 
10 rights were breached. Even if the  need to protect 
the integrity of a separate, ongoing  investigation was 
an exceptional circumstance that could delay the 
implementation of s. 10 (a)  rights or justify the 
BY THE BOOK:
s.	 10(a)	 &	 (b): Charter
Arrest or Detention
s. 10. Everyone has the right on arrest or 
detention
(a) to be informed promptly of the reasons 
therefor;
(b) to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be 
informed of that right ...
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suspension of s. 10  (b)  rights, exceptional 
circumstances did not arise on the facts in this case 
as was found by the trial judge.  Justice Rothstein 
stated:
The trial judge found as a fact that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the assertion 
that immediate compliance with s. 10   of the 
Charter  would have compromised the broader 
investigation. The trial judge acknowledged that 
[the detective] testified that the delay was due to 
concerns about compromising the ongoing 
investigation. However, the judge went on to 
find that there was no evidence about why 
simply advising [the accused] of the reason for 
his arrest or informing him of his right to counsel 
would have frustrated the ongoing investigation 
of [the principal target] and other gang 
members. Ultimately, the trial judge found that 
there was no evidence of a “real and present 
danger that the operation would be frustrated or 
compromised”. The Crown has not established a 
legal basis for assailing these factual findings. 
[references omitted, para. 75]
Since there were no exceptional circumstances that 
would justify police delaying  compliance with s. 10  
informational duties, the  accused’s s. 10  (a) and (b) 
rights were infringed.
As for the exclusion of evidence  under s. 24(2), the 
trial judge was owed considerable deference. He 
applied the  proper test - the  seriousness of the 
Charter  breach, the impact of the breach on the 
protected interests of the accused, and society’s 
interest in the adjudication of the  case on its merits. 
The accused’s appeal was allowed and his acquittal 
was restored.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
PRODUCTION	 ORDER	 MAY	 
ISSUE	 ON	 BASIS	 OF	 
REASONABLE	 SUSPICION
R. v. Fedossenko, 2014 ABCA 314
Following  a single vehicle accident, 
the accused was taken to hospital by 
ambulance and was accompanied by 
police. During  transport he told the 
investigating  officer that he had “a 
few beers earlier.” The officer smelled a 
faint odour of alcohol on his breath and 
noted that he had red eyes, although he 
was coherent and not slurring  his words. 
At the hospital, blood samples were 
taken for medical purposes. Then the 
officer arrested the accused for impaired 
driving, read him his Charter rights and 
made a blood demand under s. 254(3) 
of the Criminal Code. The accused 
complied with the demand and a 
second set of blood samples were taken. 
The  fo l lowing  night the of f icer 
unsuccessfully applied for a search 
warrant to obtain the hospital blood 
samples. His search warrant application 
was rejected on the basis that he had 
insufficient grounds to believe an 
offence had been committed. The off icer 
subsequently received the analysis of the blood 
samples he demanded, which showed a blood 
RELEASE WITHOUT CHARGE DOES 
NOT NEGATE REASONABLE 
GROUNDS
 The Manitoba Court of Appeal has 
upheld the first degree murder 
conviction of the accused for 
killing a rival drug dealer. He had 
argued, among other things, that 
his arrest was unlawful and therefore 
a jacket (with gunshot residue) and 
shoes (with glass-fragment evidence) 
seized at  the time of his arrest  were 
inadmissible as evidence against him. 
The trial judge found the police had 
both subjective and objective 
grounds to arrest him despite 
releasing him the next day when 
they  concluded they  did not 
have  grounds to lay a charge. 
Manitoba’s top Court agreed with 
this finding. Having insufficient grounds for a 
charge does not mean that police lacked 
reasonable grounds to make the arrest. Because 
the arrest was lawful, the seizure  of his jacket and 
shoes was lawful too. - R. v. Heickert, 2014 MBCA 
81. 
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alcohol concentration over the legal limit. He then 
used those results to help obtain a production order 
under s. 487.012 of the Criminal Code for the 
hospital records related to the blood samples taken 
for medical purposes. The production order was 
granted
   
Alberta Provincial Court
   
The Crown conceded the  evidence 
obtained through the s. 254(3)  blood 
demand was inadmissible because the 
justice of the peace who denied the 
search warrant had already determined there were 
insufficient reasonable grounds to believe an offence 
had been committed. The Crown did not attempt to 
tender this evidence, instead relying  solely on the 
hospital records obtained by the production order to 
establish the accused’s blood alcohol concentration. 
The accused, however, objected on the basis that the 
production order was invalid. Since the investigating 
officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe 
an offence had been committed, he submitted that 
police did not meet the requirements of s. 487.012
(3). The Crown, on the other hand, argued all that 
was required was a reasonable suspicion that an 
offence had been committed. 
The judge agreed with the accused, found the 
hospital records were obtained in breach of s. 8 of 
the Charter because reasonable grounds for the 
production order had not been met. The hospital 
records were excluded under s. 24(2)  and the 
accused was found not guilty of impaired driving.
 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The appeal judge upheld the trial judge’s 
interpretation of s. 487.012(3)  and found 
the standard for granting  a production 
order was the same as that required for a 
search warrant under s. 487(1)  - reasonable grounds 
to believe an offence has been committed. The 
Crown’s appeal was dismissed.
          
Alberta Court of Appeal
    
The Crown further appealed, again arguing  a 
production order could be issued on the basis of a 
reasonable suspicion that an offence has been 
committed and that reasonable and probable 
grounds was not required. 
A View of Two
Justices Picard and Watson, 
writing  the majority opinion, 
concluded that both lower 
courts incorrectly interpreted 
the language of s. 487.012(3) to mean that only 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an 
offence has been committed is required. Instead, the 
language of s. 487.012(3) includes reasonable 
grounds to believe that an offence has been or is 
suspected to have been committed. This language 
incorporates the option of reasonable suspicion - a 
familiar and constitutionally legitimate standard:
Under the circumstances here, the police were 
not required to show reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe the offence was in fact 
committed in order to meet the requirement in s 
487.012(3)(a) of the Code. The purpose of the 
production order was to verify the reasonable 
suspicion that the offence was committed. 
Moreover, in the circumstances of this case, it is 
clear that this was not an attempt by the police 
to circumvent their duties or to otherwise cure 
BY THE BOOK:
Production	 Order: Criminal Code
s. 487.012(3) Before making an order, the 
justice or judge must be satisfied, on the basis 
of an ex parte application containing 
information on oath in writing, that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that
(a) an offence against this Act or any other Act of 
Parliament has been or is suspected to have been 
committed;
(b) the documents or data will afford evidence respecting 
the commission of the offence; and
(c) the person who is subject to the order has possession or 
control of the documents or data.
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an earlier failed attempt to obtain similar 
evidence but in a different fashion. The tests are 
simply different. Nothing in this case had the 
effect of placing the accused’s medical interests 
in direct tension with his constitutional rights. 
[para. 8]
The Crown’s appeal was allowed and a new trial was 
ordered.
 
Another Opinion
Justice O’Ferrall, in dissent, would uphold 
the appeal judge’s interpretation of s. 
487.012(3). “Reasonable  suspicion ... is 
not sufficient under ... section 487.012(3)
(a) for intrusive searches,” he said. “A belief based 
on reasonable grounds is required. A reasonably 
grounded belief means the person asserting  the 
belief in support of the warrant or production order 
must subjectively believe that an offence has been or 
is suspected of having  been committed and that 
there  are objectively reasonable grounds for holding 
that belief. It must be a credibly  based belief.” 
Furthermore, even if a  different standard were 
applied, Justice O’Ferrall found there was insufficient 
admissible  evidence to support the  issuance of the 
production order.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
REASONABLE	 OPPORTUNITY	 &	 
DUE	 DILIGENCE	 DEPEND	 ON	 
CIRCUMSTANCES
R. v. Dufault, 2014 ABCA 271
A police officer stopped the accused 
as part of routine traffic enforcement. 
He asked her for her driving 
documents and smelled alcohol on 
her breath. She  confirmed she had 
consumed alcohol and failed an approved screening 
device  test. She was arrested for impaired driving, 
given an evidentiary breath demand, advised of her 
Charter rights and asked to speak with a lawyer. At 
the police station she was placed in a phone room 
equipped with several phonebooks and a poster 
with the 1-800 number for Legal Aid. After being  in 
the phone room for about five minutes, the officer 
noticed that she was not using  the phone. He 
entered the room and the accused explained that 
she had called the Legal Aid number but it was busy. 
The officer told her “the world is full of 
lawyers, call one”, then left the phone room.
After about 11 minutes, the accused finished talking 
on the phone. She told the officer she received legal 
advice. She did not, however, say  she wanted to 
receive legal advice from Legal Aid specifically, nor 
did she  tell the  officer that she had not done so, or 
that she required a further opportunity to do so. She 
then provided evidentiary breath samples showing 
she had a blood alcohol concentration over the legal 
limit.
Alberta Provincial Court
The accused argued her right to counsel 
was violated because the officer interfered 
with her right to counsel of choice. She 
testified that on the way to the  police 
station she had decided she wanted to call Legal Aid 
for advice  because it was free. After the officer spoke 
to her in the phone room, she said she felt pressured 
that she could not call Legal Aid again and that she 
had to call a lawyer from the phone book, which she 
did not want to do. But she did not tell the officer 
that she specifically wanted to receive legal advice 
from Legal Aid. She said that she received advice 
from a lawyer she selected from the Yellow Pages. 
Further, the only reason she wanted to call Legal Aid 
was because it was free and she did not know the 
names of any lawyers at Legal Aid, nor the 
competency of their advice or skill level. 
“Under the circumstances here, the police were not required to show reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe the offence was in fact committed in order to meet the 
requirement in s 487.012(3)(a) of the Code. The purpose of the production order was to 
verify the reasonable suspicion that the offence was committed.”
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The judge found there was no violation of 
the accused’s right to counsel in the 
circumstances. Further, the officer’s 
comment that “the world is full of 
lawyers, call one” was a  statement 
of fact and did not interfere with 
the exercise of her right to counsel. 
The officer discharged both his 
informational and implementational 
duties as required by s 10(b) and therefore there 
was no Charter breach. The accused was convicted 
of operating  a motor vehicle  with a blood alcohol 
content over 80mg%.
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The appeal judge found that the officer 
provided the accused with a reasonable 
opportunity to contact counsel by giving 
her privacy, the telephone and various 
resources setting  out information about available 
lawyers including  the  1-800 number for Legal Aid. 
The officer’s comment about many other lawyers 
being  available was merely encouragement to 
continue efforts to exercise her right to counsel. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Alberta Court of Appeal 
The accused applied for and sought leave 
to further appeal arguing, in part, the 
court below erred in finding  that she had 
been given a  reasonable opportunity 
under s. 10(b)  of the Charter to retain and instruct 
counsel of her choice. She also claimed that the trial 
judge erred in finding  that she had not been diligent 
in exercising  her right to consult counsel. Justice 
Veldhuis, however, dismissed the application for 
leave. 
Questions of “reasonable opportunity” and “due 
diligence” are matters best left to the trial judge for 
assessment based on the context or circumstances 
arising  from the evidence. In this case, the accused’s 
only  explanation for calling  Legal Aid was because it 
was free and any other lawyer may not be free. 
Nevertheless, she spoke to counsel she found in the 
Yellow pages. She never told the  officer that she 
wished to speak with a Legal Aid lawyer as her 
counsel of choice. The burden was 
on her to be reasonably diligent in 
exercising  her right to counsel of 
choice by telling  the officer that she 
wished to speak  to Legal Aid, a 
different lawyer, or required more time. 
In this case, there was no error made in 
finding  the officer had discharged both his 
informational and implementational duties 
as required by  s 10(b)  of the Charter. The 
grounds of appeal raised by the accused do not arise 
on the facts nor were they reasonably arguable 
found Justice Veldhuis. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
 “We will argue that at the same time as crime is 
declining, the cost of dealing with crime by the 
police, the courts, and the prisons has become 
greater. At least part of the reason for this increase 
in costs has been the requirements of the justice 
system itself. To safeguard the rights of Canadians, 
the Supreme Court of Canada has imposed a set of 
evolving requirements on the police and 
prosecution that make it manifestly more 
expensive to capture and prosecute. Not to put too 
fine a point on it, the cost per conviction has risen 
sharply as a result of the Court’s reinterpretation 
of police and prosecutorial practices even without 
changes by Parliament to the law.” [p. 1]
... ... ...
“A recent study found that the amount of time 
needed to complete the paperwork that is an 
essential part of policing has expanded from about 
an hour and a half per shift 30 years ago to over 
four hours per shift now. Further, most general 
duty police officers now spend more time on 
paperwork than on patrol and investigation 
combined. This change seems to be driven by 
changing legal demands for better and more 
detailed documentation of events by police and by 
development of tools such as mobile data 
terminals that make that documentation more 
feasible.” [p. 62]
“The Cost of Crime in Canada” - Fraser Institute
REPORTS - RESEARCH - REVIEWS
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2013	 POLICE	 REPORTED	 CRIME
In July 2014 Statistics Canada 
released its “Police reported 
crime statistics in  Canada, 
2013” report. Highlights of this 
recent collection of crime data 
include:
• There were 1,824,837 crimes (excluding  traffic) 
reported to Canadian police in 2013; this 
represents 132,390 fewer crimes reported when 
compared to 2012.
• The total crime rate dropped -8%. This includes a 
violent crime rate  drop  of -9% and a property 
crime rate drop of -8%.
YK
T-165.7
V-149.3
NV-171.3
T=Total Crime Severity Index
V=Violent Crime Severity Index
NV=Non-Violent Crime Severity Index
SK
T-125.7 
V-120.2
NV-127.5
AB
T-83.7
V-83.2
NV-83.7
BC
T-89.2
V-81.5
NV-91.8
QC
T-62.3
V-67.8
NV-60.1
ON
T-52.5
V-61.9
NV-49.0
MB
T-100.3
V-136.0
NV-87.2
NWT
T-314.4
V-303.8
NV-317.6
NU
T-281.9
V-422.7
NV-230.1
NB
T-59.7
V-58.5
NV-60.1
NF
T-68.4
V-65.7
NV-69.2
NS
T-69.8
V-72.6
NV-68.6
PEI
T-64.5
V-43.3
NV-72.1
Police-Reported Crime Severity Indexes
Police-Reported Impaired Driving Offences
Province Rate Impaired Driving 
Offences
Rate change 
2012 to 2013
SK 635 7,041 -11%
AB 364 14,662 -11%
NF 328 1,726 -7%
PEI 307 446 -5%
NS 306 2,875 +6%
BC 304 13,925 -4%
MB 264 3,337 -4%
NB 247 1,868 -14%
QC 191 15,583 -9%
ON 117 15,806 -9%
The Crime Severity Index (CSI) is another measure of police-reported crime. 
Each offence is assigned a weight, derived from sentences handed down by 
criminal courts. The more serious the average sentence, the higher the offence is 
weighted. The weighted offences are then summed and divided by the population. 
An overall CSI has been created as well as a violent CSI and non-violent CSI.
Source: Statistics Canada, 2014, “Police-reported crime statistics in 
Canada, 2013”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on July 23, 2014.
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YK
23,523
+14%
MB
7,967
-11%
SK
10,644
-7%
AB
7,018
-3%
BC
7,454
-6%
NWT
45,763
-4%
QC
3,861
-11%
ON
3,678
-9%
NF
5,955
-2%
NU
32,345
-15%
PEI
5,854
-11%
NB
4,813
-13%
NS
5,632
-11%
Police-Reported Crime Rates per 100,000 population
Canada’s Top Ten Reported Crimes
Offence Number
Theft Under $5,000 (non-motor vehicle) 471,924
Mischief 273,597
Administration of Justice Violations 176,431
Assault-level 1 158,090
Break and Enter 156,357
Disturb the Peace 109,830
Fraud (excluding identity fraud) 79,765
Impaired Driving 78,391
Theft of Motor Vehicle 72,804
Uttering Threats 63,970
Homicide
There were 505 homicides reported, 38  less than the 
previous year. Ontario had the most homicides at 
166, followed by Alberta  (82), British Columbia (76) 
and Quebec (68). The Yukon reported no homicides 
while Prince Edward Island only reported one 
homicide followed by the Northwest Territories (2) 
and Nunavut (4). As for provincial or territorial 
homicide rates, Nunavut had the highest rate (11.24 
per 100,000 population) followed by the Northwest 
Territories (4.59), Manitoba (3.87), Saskatchewan 
(2.71) and Alberta (2.04). As for Census Metropolitan 
Areas (CMA’s), Regina, SK had the highest homicide 
rate at 3.84. The Canadian homicide rate was 1.44.
Canada
5,190
-8%
Top CMA Homicide Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Regina, SK 3.84 Calgary,  AB 1.75
Winnipeg, MB 3.24 Vancouver, BC 1.72
Thunder Bay, ON 2.46 Abbotsford-Mission, BC 1.69
Edmonton,  AB 2.09 Saskatoon, SK 1.67
Hamilton, ON 2.04 Kelowna, BC 1.62
London, ON 1.80 Gatineau, QC 1.55
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Robbery
In 2013 there were 23,213 robberies reported, 
resulting  in a national rate of 66 robberies per 
100,000 population. Manitoba had the highest 
robbery rate followed by British Columbia, 
Saskatchewan and Ontario. 
• Winnipeg, MB had the highest CMA 
rate  for robbery in Canada (178), 
-28% lower than its 2012 rate. Kingston, 
ON had the  lowest rate (12). Only one CMA 
reported a jump  of more than 30% in its robbery 
rate; Moncton, NB (+42%). 
• Four CMAs reported declines in robberies of 
-30% or more; Kingston, ON (-47%), Kelowna, 
BC (-39%), Quebec City, QC (-39%)  and 
London, ON (-37%).
Break and Enter
In 2013 there were 156,357 break-
ins reported to police. The national 
break-in rate was 445 break-ins per 
100,000 people. The Nunavut had 
the highest break-in rate (1,686) 
followed by Northwest Territories (1,378). 
Police-Reported Robberies
Province/ 
Territory
Rate Robberies Rate change 
2012 to 2013
MB 130 1,647 -24%
BC 79 3,600 -21%
SK 78 867 -18%
ON 66 8,912 -18%
AB 65 2,625 -7%
QC 59 4,846 -17%
NWT 55 24 +5%
NS 36 336 -24%
NF 27 142 0%
NB 23 176 +9%
YK 22 8 -28%
NU 20 7 -2%
PEI 16 23 -12%
CANADA 66 23,213 -17%
Top Ten CMA Robbery Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Winnipeg, MB 178 Regina, SK 101
Saskatoon, SK 138 Toronto, ON 96
Thunder Bay, ON 115 Edmonton, AB 89
Vancouver, BC 108 Windsor, ON 73
Montreal, QC 102 Calgary, AB 69
Police-Reported Break-ins
Province/
Territory
Rate Break-ins Rate change 
2012 to 2013
NU 1,686 600 -6%
NWT 1,378 600 -9%
SK 682 7,559 -13%
BC 621 28,458 -6%
MB 619 7,832 -16%
YK 586 215 +4%
NF 514 2,706 -3%
QC 481 39,247 -16%
AB 479 19,263 -4%
PEI 445 646 -23%
NS 433 4,070 -15%
NB 405 3,065 -15%
ON 311 42,096 -15%
CANADA 504 175,712 -4%
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• Break-ins accounted for about 14% of all 
property crimes.
• Break-ins dropped -12% from the previous year.
• From 2003  to 2013, the break-in rate dropped by 
-51%.
• Among  CMAs, Vancouver, BC reported the 
highest break-in rate (689)  while Toronto, ON 
and Barrie, ON reported the lowest (227). Only 
one CMA reported an increase in its break-in rate 
- Sherbrooke, QC (+5%).  Ten CMA’s reported 
drops of 20% or more including  Moncton, NB 
(-29%), St.. John’s, NL (-25%), Victoria, BC 
(-25%), Barrie, ON (-24%), Gatineau, QC 
(-24%), Saint John, NB (-24%)  Trois-Rivieres, QC 
(-24%), Peterborough, ON, (-23%), Saguenay, 
QC (-22%), and London, ON (-21%).
Drugs
In 2013  there were 109,057 drug-related offences 
coming  to the attention of police. These offences 
included possession, trafficking, production or 
distribution. 
• possession offences        
accounted for 77,780 of 
these crimes - cannabis 
(58,965); cocaine (7,696); 
and other drugs (11,119). 
Other drugs include heroin, 
crystal meth, and ecstasy.
• Trafficking, production, and 
distribution offences totaled 
33,518 - cannabis (14,308); 
cocaine (9,749); and other 
drugs (7,220).
• British Columbia had the 
highest drug  related offence 
rates of all 10 provinces for 
cannabis and other drugs 
while Newfoundland topped 
the list for cocaine.
• Incidents of possession of 
crystal meth increased from 2,613 in 2012 to 
3,345 in 2013 while  possession of heroin 
increased from 779 incidents to 915. 
• Overall, drug  offences were down in 2013  from 
2012 (-2%).
• The territories continue to have some of the 
highest drug-related crime rates in Canada.
Top Ten CMA Break-in Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Vancouver, BC 689 Winnipeg, MB 560
Regina, SK 639 Greater Sudbury, ON 557
Kelowna, BC 635 Abbotsford-Mission, BC 549
Brantford, ON 609 St. John’s, NL 511
Saskatoon, SK 589 Thunder Bay, ON 509
10%
76%
14%
Other drugs
Cannabis
Cocaine
Possession Offences     
by Drug Type
31%
46%
23%
Other drugs
Cannabis
Cocaine
Trafficking, Production  & Distribution 
Offences by Drug Type
Drug-related Crime Rates by Province
per 100,000 population
Province Cannabis 
rate
Cocaine   
rate
Other 
drugs rate
BC 398 93 85
SK 293 136 61
NS 236 37 52
QC 193 26 57
AB 187 72 39
NF 184 159 58
MB 175 76 34
NB 160 28 47
ON 154 35 43
PEI 80 23 81
Territory Cannabis 
rate
Cocaine   
rate
Other 
drugs rate
NU 1,000 17 34
NWT 930 305 53
YK 302 210 34
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Motor Vehicle Theft
In 2013 there were 72,804 motor vehicle thefts 
reported to police, down -8% from 2012 and down 
-62% from a decade ago.
• the motor vehicle theft rate was 207 per 100,000 
population.
• the most vehicles reported stolen was in Quebec 
(17,776)  while  the Prince Edward Island had the 
fewest vehicles stolen (120).
• Most CMAs reported declines in motor vehicle 
thefts. Several reported double digit decreases of 
more than -20% including  Kelowna, BC (-38%), 
Greater Sudbury, ON (-28%), Victoria, BC 
(-28%), Guelph, ON (-25%), Trois-Rivieres, QC 
(-25%), Quebec City, QC (-24%), Sherbrooke, 
QC (-24%), Windsor, ON (-24%), Hamilton, ON 
(-22%), Gatineau, QC (-21%), Ottawa, ON 
(-21%) and Regina, SK (-21%).  
• Only  five CMAs saw an increase in their motor 
vehicle theft rates; Edmonton, AB (+18%), 
Abbotsford-Mission, BC (+14%), Calgary, AB 
(+12%), Thunder Bay, ON (+9%) and Saskatoon, 
SK (+4%). 
MOST	 POPULAR	 AUTO	 THEFT	 
TARGETS
On December 19, 2013 the Insurance Bureau of 
Canada released its annual list of the most frequently 
stolen vehicles in Canada. According  to the report 
there  is an increasing  involvement of organized 
crime in auto theft as evidenced by the appearance 
of all-terrain vehicles on the list. 
Source: Insurance Bureau of Canada www.ibc.ca
Police-Reported Motor Vehicle Thefts
Province/
Territory
Rate Motor Vehicle 
Thefts
Rate change 
2012 to 2013
YK 520 191 +29%
NWT 395 172 -13%
AB 395 15,903 +11%
SK 386 4,274 -3%
NU 360 128 -21%
MB 287 3,631 -4%
BC 253 11,583 -9%
QC 218 17,766 -16%
NB 137 1,037 -10%
ON 121 16,410 -15%
NS 114 1,075 -19%
NF 98 514 +2%
PEI 83 120 -25%
CANADA 223 77,939 -7%
Top Ten CMA Vehicle Theft Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Brantford, ON 418 Abbotsford-Mission, BC 309
Saskatoon, SK 379 Winnipeg, MB 306
Edmonton,  AB 378 Montreal, QC 270
Regina, SK 378 Vancouver, BC 270
Calgary, AB 364 Kelowna, BC 267
TOP 10 STOLEN AUTOS - Canada 2012
YR MAKE MODEL
1 2000 Honda Civic SiR 2-door
2 2006 Chevrolet Trail Blazer SS 4-door 4WD SUV
3 2002 Cadillac Escalade 4-door 4WD SUV
4 2005 Cadillac Escalade 4-door 4WD SUV
5 2006 Ford F350 SD 4WD PU
6 2005 Cadillac Escalade ESV 4-door AWD SUV
7 2006 Acura RSX Type S 2-door 2D
8 2007 Ford F250 SD 4WD PU
9 2007 Ford F350 SD 4WD PU
10 2003 Acura RSX Type S 2-door 2D
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NO-KNOCK	 ENTRY	 JUSTIFIED:
EXIGENT	 CIRCUMSTANCES	 
ESTABLISHED	 
R. v. Lucas, 2014 ONCA 561
 
Following  an extensive investigation 
(code-named Project XXX) into the 
Doomstown Crips criminal gang 
involving  wiretap  and covert entries, 
the police executed “take-down 
warrants.” The take-down warrants authorized the 
police to enter and search many homes without 
knocking  or giving  notice to the occupants and, at 
the same time, arrests them. Pursuant to the 80 take-
down warrants, the police arrested 102 people, 
including  Lucas, Rosa and Chau, in the early 
morning  hours during  dynamic  no-knock entries. 
Police recovered evidence including  cash, 
marijuana, money counters, cell phones, and 
documents. The three men, along  with others, were 
charged with numerous firearms and/or drug-related 
offences. 
 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
 
Lucas, Rosa and Chau brought a  pre-trial 
motion, one  of many, challenging  the 
execution of the take-down warrants to 
their homes. They suggested there was an 
insufficient foundation for dispensing  with the 
requirements of “knock and notice”. They wanted 
the evidence obtained during  the take-down search 
warrants excluded. The judge, however, rejected 
these submissions and the men were convicted of 
several charges including  conspiracy, firearms, and 
proceeds of crime related offences.
Ontario Court of Appeal
 
Lucas, Rosa and Chau contended, 
among  other things, that the trial 
judge erred in failing  to find that 
the removal of the knock and 
notice requirements in the take-down warrants 
violated s. 8  of the Charter. They argued that the 
dynamic entries to their homes were unreasonable.
 
In its decision, the Court of Appeal noted the 
requirements for a reasonable search of a dwelling 
house:
 
[T]the police should, except in exigent 
circumstances, give the occupants notice by 
knocking or ringing  the doorbell, identify 
themselves as law enforcement officers, and 
state the lawful reason for their entry. Where the 
police depart from the “knock and notice” 
approach, there must be evidence available to 
them at the time they acted, that they thought it 
necessary to dispense with knock and notice 
because they had reasonable grounds to be 
concerned about harm to themselves or the 
occupants, or about the destruction of evidence. 
[reference omitted, para. 254].
 
Lucas and Rosa first argued that there were no 
exigent circumstances for the dynamic entries 
because  the police could have arrested them the 
previous evening  while  they were at a mall parking 
lot. They submitted that an earlier arrest would have 
avoided the necessity  for the dynamic entries the 
next morning. This argument had been rejected by 
the trial judge and his assessment was agreed with 
by the Court of Appeal. The trial judge noted that the 
police needed to take a synchronized approach to 
the searches and arrests to prevent some targets from 
“[T]the police should, except in exigent circumstances, give the occupants notice by 
knocking or ringing the doorbell, identify themselves as law enforcement officers, and 
state the lawful reason for their entry. Where the police depart from the “knock and 
notice” approach, there must be evidence available to them at the time they acted, that 
they thought it necessary to dispense with knock and notice because they had 
reasonable grounds to be concerned about harm to themselves or the occupants, or 
about the destruction of evidence.” 
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alerting  others, which could lead to the real 
possibility that evidence could be destroyed and 
intended targets could escape. The trial judge found 
that arresting  the two men in the mall parking  lot 
would have compromised a synchronized approach. 
Furthermore, arresting  them in a public place could 
have put police and public safety at risk; both men 
were believed to be trafficking  guns and drugs to a 
violent gang. “There was ample evidence before the 
trial judge that the arrests of Lucas and Rosa in the 
mall parking  lot would have created a real risk of 
evidence destruction and harm to the police or the 
public,” said the Court of Appeal.  “Avoiding  these 
risks does not render the dynamic entry of the 
residences early the next morning unreasonable.”
 
Second, the men suggested that the executions of 
the warrants were unreasonable  because police did 
not consider the particular circumstances of each 
entry. It was argued that the entries were conducted 
entirely  on the basis of an operational plan to 
coordinate all searches on a “no-knock” basis. This 
argument too failed because one of the lead 
investigators testified that the team leader in each 
case  made their own determination prior to 
executing  the warrant. In their view, “no-knock” 
entries were justified in each case independent of 
the overall plan.
 
Finally, Chau contended that the police had no basis 
to effect a “no-knock” forced entry of his residence. 
He argued that the police had no information 
linking  him to violence or firearms. Therefore, he 
submitted there was no basis for concern about 
officer safety if the police did not use a dynamic 
entry. The Court of Appeal, however, was 
unconvinced. The trial judge found that the police 
had information about a direct connection between 
Chau with Lucas and Rosa (both who had access to 
firearms), which raised the possibility that Chau 
might well have come to possess a firearm from 
them. The judge also concluded that the  police had 
an additional concern for officer safety if a dynamic 
entry  was not made because there was information 
indicating  that Chau was a high-level dealer in the 
notoriously dangerous business of drug-dealing, 
where many possess firearms for their own 
protection. The Court of Appeal opined that there 
was ample evidence for the trial judge to find that 
there  were exigent circumstances justifying  the use 
of a no-knock entry to Chau’s residence.
 
The conviction appeals were dismissed.
Complete case available at ww.ontariocourts.on.ca
ARREST	 &	 DEMAND	 REQUIRED	 
SEPARATE	 ANALYSIS
R. v. Rezansoff, 2014 SKCA 80
After several motorists called 911 to 
repor t a t ruck  be ing  d r iven 
erratically, a police officer followed 
the vehicle at speeds between 120 
to 140 km/h for about 15 minutes 
before pulling  the vehicle over. The officer, however, 
did not see erratic driving  himself. When he 
activated his lights, the vehicle drove very slow and 
stopped in a parking  lot. The accused was slow and 
deliberate  as he checked his pockets for 
identification and his eyes were glassy.  The officer 
noticed an odour of alcohol coming  from the truck 
and a beer case between the two front seats. While 
the accused was still in the vehicle, he was arrested 
for impaired driving. He got out of his vehicle  and 
fell into the vehicle’s door. He was handcuffed and 
taken back to the police car. After calling  for 
backup, the officer spoke to the passenger who 
admitted both he and the driver had been drinking. 
The accused was taken to the police  station where 
he was read his rights and a proper demand for a 
breathalyzer was made. He was given the 
opportunity to contact a lawyer but declined to do 
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so.  About an hour later it was determined the 
breathalyzer instrument was not working  and the 
accused was then taken to another detachment. He 
refused to properly blow into the breathalyzer and a 
valid breath sample could not be  obtained. He was 
charged with impaired driving, driving  while 
disqualified and refusing to provide a breath sample.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The accused pled guilty to driving  while 
disqualified, but challenged the impaired 
driving  and refusal charges. The  judge 
found the police officer did not have 
reasonable grounds to arrest the accused for 
impaired driving.  Although the judge accepted the 
police officer had the necessary subjective belief,  he 
found the officer did not have a proper objective 
basis for that belief.  The arresting  officer had 
followed the vehicle for about 30 kms but did not 
see any bad driving. Further, there  was no evidence 
the smell of alcohol came from the 
accused’s breath. 
The judge felt the officer was 
“jumping  the gun” by arresting  the 
accused while  he was still in the 
vehicle. He held the accused’s s. 9 
Charter rights had been breached, 
excluded all of the evidence before 
the arresting  officer saw the truck 
and followed it, and entered an 
acquittal to the impaired driving 
charge. The judge did, however, 
admit the post-arrest evidence of 
the refusal to provide a breath 
sample under s . 24(2)  and 
convicted him accordingly.  The 
accused was sentenced to three months in jail and 
given a three year driving ban. 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused successfully  appealed his 
conviction. The appeal judge ruled that, 
since the arrest was unlawful, the breath 
demand was not valid and the accused 
was under no legal obligation to provide a breath 
sample pursuant to the faulty demand - he had a 
reasonable excuse to refuse to comply.  This ended 
the matter and it was unnecessary to determine 
whether there was a Charter  breach. However, the 
appeal judge nevertheless found that there was a s. 9 
Charter breach and possibly a s. 8 breach as well. 
The appeal judge, conducting  his own s. 24(2) 
analysis, would have excluded the evidence. The 
accused’s conviction was set aside and an acquittal 
was entered on the refusal charge. 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
Th e C r ow n ch a l l e n g e d t h e 
accused’s acquittal for refusal, 
arguing  the appeal judge made an 
error in conflating  the lawfulness of 
the arrest with the lawfulness of the breath 
demand.  In the Crown’s view, there were sufficient 
grounds for a  breath demand. The Crown also 
submitted that because there were sufficient grounds 
for the arrest as well.
Justice Lane, speaking  for an 
unanimous Court of Appeal, 
agreed that the appeal judge did 
err by conflating  the lawfulness of 
the arrest and the lawfulness of the 
demand.  “The lawfulness of the 
demand must be determined at 
the time the demand and the 
lawfulness of the arrest must be 
determined at the time of the 
arrest,” said Justice Lane. “Driving 
while impaired and refusing  a 
breath sample are two separate 
offences. One does not necessarily 
follow the other.” The Court of 
Appeal found that neither court 
below considered the lawfulness of the  demand as a 
component of a distinct offence. It described the 
breath demand provision as follows:
A plain reading  of s. 254(3) suggests the precise 
point at which a peace officer must have 
reasonable grounds to believe a person is 
committing or, at any time within the three 
preceding  hours, has committed an offence 
under s.  253 as a result of the consumption of 
alcohol does not matter as long as the peace 
officer has the reasonable grounds to believe at 
the time of making the demand. [para. 25]
“The lawfulness of the 
demand must be determined 
at the time the demand and 
the lawfulness of the arrest 
must be determined at the 
time of the arrest. Driving 
while impaired and refusing 
a breath sample are two 
separate offences. One 
does not necessarily follow 
the other.”
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In this case, the factors articulated by the arresting 
officer were capable of supporting  his belief that the 
accused was impaired at the time of driving. “It is 
clear that all of the observations both prior to and 
after the arrest made by 
the arresting  officer would 
fully  support a demand for 
a breath sample,” said 
Justice Lane. “We are 
satisfied the post-arrest 
conduct of the accused 
and the observations of 
the arresting  officer and 
the admission by the 
accused passenger they had both been drinking  are 
sufficient to ground the arresting  officer’s subjective 
belief with an objective base.”  There were no 
Charter breaches and it was not necessary for the 
Court to address the other grounds of appeal raised 
by the Crown. The Crown’s appeal was allowed and 
the conviction for refusing  to provide a breath 
sample was restored.  
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
SEARCH	 OF	 CELL	 PHONE	 
INCIDENT	 TO	 ARREST	 NOT	 
UNREASONABLE
R. v. Cater, 2014 NSCA 74
 
During  a massive joint police 
investigation into the activities of a 
criminal organization known as the 
Spryfield Mob for a variety of crimes 
including  attempted murder, other 
violent offences and drug  crimes (code named 
Operation Intrude), police obtained an authorization 
to intercept the private communications of 
individuals believed to be involved.  The accused, 
one of the named targets, was arrested as part of the 
“take-down” day  involving  about 100 police 
officers. His cell phone was seized during  the 
booking  process at the police station.  An officer 
collected the phone later that day and removed the 
battery to prevent damaging  evidence stored 
inside.  The phone was sent for forensic analysis a 
week later, and an analysis and subsequent report 
were completed about 1.5 months later. The police 
did not obtain a search warrant before sending  the 
phone off for forensic analysis nor was a cursory 
search performed on the cell phone. Police officers 
were ordered not to examine the  device, or thumb 
through the text messages or phone calls because 
doing  so could corrupt potential evidence.  Forensic 
analysis resulted in evidence, including  text 
messages, contact information and digital images of 
firearms, supporting  the  Crown’s case. The accused 
was subsequently charged with several weapons 
crimes, including  firearms storage, possession and 
trafficking offences. 
Nova Scotia Provincial Court
The judge found the seizure of the 
accused’s cell phone did not breach the 
Charter.  He had been lawfully arrested 
for possessing  a restricted firearm (and 
could have been arrested for weapons trafficking), 
was legitimately searched incident 
to his arrest and his cell phone was 
lawfully seized.  The judge also 
ruled that the  police were entitled 
to have the phone forensically 
analyzed as an incident to the 
arrest. The search, he concluded, 
was also conducted reasonably. No 
warrant was required. 
In the event the evidence was 
unconstitutionally obtained, the 
trial judge  would have nonetheless 
admitted it under s. 24(2). First, any 
breach was inadvertent and not 
serious.  The police officers had 
acted in good faith and the law 
with respect to the search of cell 
phones was evolving  at the  time of 
this search. The police  testified that 
the seizure of all arrestees’ cell 
phones was essential to the 
investigation and, based on their 
experience, could provide valuable 
evidence. Second, the search of the 
cell phone had a modest impact 
upon the accused’s s. 8  Charter 
rights and the subsequent forensic 
search, in the absence of a warrant, 
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was a technical breach. The police clearly had the 
grounds to obtain a warrant and, had they done so, 
the evidence would have been discovered. Further, 
the evidence would have been discovered had the 
police conducted a cursory search of the phone. 
And the delay between the arrest and the forensic 
analysis was not excessive or unwarranted. Plus, the 
cell phone was not a smart phone and it had a very 
limited capacity, described by the judge as the 
technological equivalent of an unlocked brief case 
containing  correspondence (text messages), an 
address book (contact information), and photographs 
(digital images). Finally, the evidence in his cell 
phone was valuable to the prosecution and the truth-
seeking  function of the criminal trial process. The 
accused was convicted of several of the weapons 
offences and sentenced to eight years in prison. 
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
The accused challenged his 
convictions on many grounds 
including  the constitutionality  of 
the cell phone search. In his 
opinion, the trial judge erred in finding  the search 
reasonable under s. 8 of the Charter and the 
information found during  the search should have 
ben ruled inadmissible under s. 24(2). 
But the Court of Appeal disagreed. Although the law 
about searching  cell phones incidental to arrest is 
unsettled - there is currently a Supreme Court of 
Canada decision on reserve (R. v. Fearon)  - Justice 
Saunders found the trial judge did not err in finding 
no Charter breach. The search of the cell phone was 
a search incident to the accused’s lawful arrest. The 
contents of the phone as extracted, including  the 
metadata, were admissible. And, even if the 
warrantless forensic search of the phone was 
unconstitutional, the evidence should not have been 
excluded under s. 24(2)  as found by the trial judge. 
She considered the proper factors, her findings were 
reasonable and her decision to admit the evidence 
was owed deference. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
s.	 489	 AUTHORIZES	 SEIZURE	 OF	 
MATERIAL	 UNRELATED	 TO	 
WARRANT	 OFFENCE
R. v. Witen, 2014 ONCA 694
The investigative branch of the 
Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) 
obtained and executed a  search 
warrant at the  accused’s home and 
office related to criminal tax  evasion. 
The accused was an accountant and corporate  tax 
preparer and the warrant authorized the search for 
records related to certain businesses. These 
documents were evidence of a fraudulent scheme in 
which the accused assisted clients in making  false 
expense  claims in their tax returns.  The frauds 
operated over about five years and cost the public 
purse in excess of $1 million.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused argued his rights under s. 8 
of the Charter had been breached and the 
evidence should have been excluded 
under s. 24(2). He submitted that 
investigators seized documents that were not 
particularized in the search warrant. The seizure  of 
these documents unrelated to the CRA investigation 
identified in the search warrant, he contended, was 
unreasonable. The judge  concluded, however, that 
the documents seized fell within the description of 
the documents to be seized that were  contained in 
the warrant. Alternatively, he found that even if the 
documents did not fall within the  language 
described in the warrant, s. 489(1)(c)  of the Criminal 
Code  authorized their seizure. Moreover, even if 
there  was a Charter breach, the evidence would be 
admissible under s. 24(2). The accused was 
convicted of two counts of fraud, sentenced to three 
years in prison and fined $448,000.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused challenged his 
convictions arguing  authorities 
improperly seized materials that 
were not within the description of 
documents particularized in the warrant. Nor was In Service: 10-8
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seizure under s. 489 of the Criminal Code applicable 
he claimed. In his view, his rights under s. 8 of the 
Charter had been breached and the evidence should 
have been excluded under s. 24(2).   
The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s finding. 
Section 489(1)(c)  allows a person executing  a 
warrant to seize “anything  that the person believes 
on reasonable grounds…will afford evidence in 
respect of an offence against this or any other act of 
Parliament”.  It continued:
Section 489(1)(c) speaks to any offence and is 
not limited to the offences in respect of which 
the warrant was obtained.  It requires belief “on 
reasonable grounds” that the seized material 
“will afford evidence in respect of an 
offence”.  ... .  There was, on the record before 
the trial judge, ample basis to conclude that the 
person seizing the material believed on 
reasonable grounds that the seized documents 
would afford evidence in respect of the 
commission of a criminal frauds. [para. 23]
The documents were properly seized under s. 489(1)
(c). And, even if some of the documents fell outside 
the power granted by s. 489(1)(c), they were 
properly admissible under s.  24(2)  of the Charter.  
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
GROUNDS	 OBJECTIVELY	 
REASONABLE:	 LAWSUIT	 
SUMMARILY	 DISMISSED
Can v. Calgary (Police Service), 2014 ABCA 322
 
The plaintiff was arrested by police 
following  an investigation into a 
forcible confinement and extortion. 
Police interviewed the complainant 
for more than an hour. He said that 
the plaintiff, along  with others, held him against his 
will in a warehouse and threatened to kill him and 
his family members if he did not pay $1 million. The 
complainant also said that the plaintiff was present 
at the warehouse and provided the others regularly 
with information about his wife  and children. 
During  these events, the complainant’s driver’s 
licence was copied and he was able to speak to his 
wife on the phone when he was forced to drive to 
his home. The complainant was able to escape after 
the man accompanying him used the bathroom. 
Police conducted further investigation. The 
complainant's wife was interviewed and she 
corroborated his statement. A woman who worked 
at the warehouse confirmed that the plaintiff had 
been there on the day in question. Two men who 
were at the warehouse generally corroborated that 
the complainant was held against his will and that 
violence was involved. The plaintiff was not asked 
“Section 489(1)(c) speaks to any 
offence and is not limited to the offences 
in respect of which the warrant was 
obtained. It requires belief “on 
reasonable grounds” that the seized 
material ‘will afford evidence in respect 
of an offence’.”
BY THE BOOK:
Seizure	 of	 Things	 Not	 Specified: Criminal Code
s. 489 (1) Every person who executes a warrant 
may seize, in addition to the things mentioned 
in the warrant, any thing that the person 
believes on reasonable grounds
(a) has been obtained by the commission of an 
offence against this or any other Act of Parliament;
(b) has been used in the commission of an offence against 
this or any other Act of Parliament; or
(c) will afford evidence in respect of an offence against this 
or any other Act of Parliament.
If you are interested in past issues of In-Service: 
10-8 or would like to be added to its email 
distribution list, go to:
www.10-8.ca
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for an interview. A detective ordered his arrest based 
on the information he had received. The plaintiff was 
charged with forcible confinement and extortion but 
the charges were stayed by Crown because the 
complainant had a criminal record in the U.S. for 
perjury.  
The plaintiff brought a  civil action against the 
Calgary Police Service and several officers (among 
others) claiming  such things as wrongful arrest, false 
imprisonment, and negligent investigation. In his 
view, the detective did not have objective 
reasonable grounds to order the arrest.
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench (Chambers)
 
Several officers applied for summary 
judgment. Summary judgment allows a 
defendant to present uncontroverted facts 
and law which would make it highly 
unlikely the plaintiff would succeed in their civil 
action. If summary judgment is granted, the lawsuit 
is disposed of before trial. The central issue 
underlying  each of the  causes of action in this suit 
was whether the detective had objective reasonable 
and probable grounds to arrest the plaintiff. If the 
detective objectively had reasonable and probable 
grounds for ordering  the arrest, the plaintiff’s actions 
would fail. 
A master of the Court of Queen’s Bench found the 
detective had the necessary objective grounds, the 
arrest was lawful and therefore there was no basis 
for the lawsuit. Summary judgment was granted.
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The plaintiff appealed the granting  of 
summary judgment. A Queen’s Bench 
justice  agreed that the detective’s 
subject ive bel ief was object ively 
reasonable in light of the facts known to him before 
the arrest. The plaintiff’s appeal was dismissed. 
Alberta Court of Appeal
The plaintiff again appealed 
the summary dismissal of his 
actions against the police. 
Justices Conrad and O’Brien, 
writing  the  majority opinion for the Court of Appeal, 
noted the two-fold reasonable and probable grounds 
test for a police officer making  an arrest as 
enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. 
Storrey, [1990] 1 SCR 241. First, the arresting  officer 
must subjectively have  reasonable and probable 
grounds to arrest. Second, those grounds must be 
justifiable  from an objective point of view. The 
police need not, however, demonstrate  anything 
more than reasonable  and probable grounds such as 
a prima facie case for conviction.
In this case, it was conceded that the officer 
directing  the arrest had the requisite subjective belief 
that the plaintiff participated in the criminal 
activities for which he was arrested. The question 
then, for resolution, was whether the objective 
standard had been met.
The plaintiff submitted that the police did not have 
reliable  and credible information at the time of his 
arrest that showed he had participated in the alleged 
illegal activity. This position, however, was rejected. 
The victim of the alleged crimes was interviewed on 
video and audio for more than an hour the day 
before the arrest. The victim told the officer that he 
had seen the plaintiff at the warehouse, that the 
plaintiff had assisted the others by providing 
information about the victim’s wife  and children, 
and he  identified the plaintiff as one of the 
individuals who held him hostage and who was as 
an active participant in the extortion. Plus, the police 
interviewed others before the arrest, including  the 
victim’s wife and the office assistant at the 
warehouse. These people tended to corroborate  the 
complaint’s statement in certain material aspects and 
demonstrated the consistency of his allegations. The 
majority stated:
While the evidence at the time of [the plaintiff’s] 
arrest concerning his involvement in the alleged 
criminal activities was not overwhelming, in the 
sense of establishing  a prima facie case for 
conviction, and additional investigation was 
ongoing and necessary, such evidence as there 
was at the time provided the necessary objective 
justification to support [the detective’s] 
subjective view that [the plaintiff] was a 
participant in the alleged extortion scheme. 
Whatever the precise measurement of the degree 
of certainty required for a warrantless arrest, 
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here the information disclosed to [the detective] 
prior to the time of arrest was sufficient to allow 
a reasonable person in his position to conclude 
that there were reasonable and probable 
grounds to arrest [the plaintiff]. [para. 9]
Since the detective had reasonable grounds for the 
arrest, there was no genuine issue for trial. Summary 
judgment was warranted and the plaintiff’s appeal 
was dismissed.
 
Minority
Justice Wakeling  gave much broader 
reasons in also dismissing  the plaintiff’s 
appeal. He too found the facts known by 
police clearly  met the test for a lawful 
warrantless arrest under s. 495(1)(a)  of the  Criminal 
Code. “There were objectively verifiable facts that 
would have caused a reasonable person with the 
training  and experience  of [the detective] and who 
was aware of the information which caused the 
officer to order [the plaintiff’s] arrest to easily 
conclude with a high degree of certainty – that it 
was more likely than not –  that [the plaintiff] had 
committed the indictable  offences of extortion and 
unlawful confinement,” he said.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
Editor’s Comments: Interestingly, Justice Wakeling 
also engaged in a lengthy discussion on the degree 
of certainty required for the standard of reasonable 
and probable grounds. In his view, the legal 
standard for a  warrantless arrest should be clear and 
a precise standard should be articulated. However, 
he noted that the  Supreme Court of Canada has 
declined to define precisely the degree of certainty 
justifying  an arrest and was troubled by this. Justice 
Wakeling  claimed that he  would “tackle this thorny 
problem,” although, in the end, he decided it was 
unnecessary to do so because, in his view, the 
detective had a  high degree of certainty in making 
the arrest. Below is a grid derived from Justice 
Wakeling’s discussion about the degree of certainty 
required for the grounds justifying an arrest. 
DEGREES OF CERTAINTY
.0001% > 10% 11% > 35% 36% > 50% 51% > 79% 80% > 
extremely low degree
of
certainty
low degree 
of 
certainty
moderate degree 
of 
certainty
high degree 
of 
certainty
Very high degree 
of 
certainty
Hunch. 
[para. 133]
Reasonable 
suspicion. 
[para. 132]
“At least more 
likely than not.” 
[para. 131]
“At least four 
times likely that 
the arrestee 
has committed 
an indictable 
offence as not.” 
[para. 130]
An extremely low 
degree of certainty 
“would give 
unjustifiable priority to 
law-enforcement 
value and force too 
many persons who 
are innocent of any 
crime to endure 
arrest.” [para. 133]
A low degree of 
certainty would 
be unacceptable 
to justify an 
arrest because it 
shows insufficient 
regard for the 
liberty value. [para. 
138]
Reasonable grounds for a warrantless arrest? If a very high degree of 
certainty was required for 
a lawful warrantless 
arrest, “police officers would 
be unable to do the job  
society has assigned to 
them if they laboured under 
such onerous 
standards.” [para. 144]
Justice Wakeling found that moderate and 
high were the only two degrees of certainty 
that may make an arrest lawful, but concluded 
that it was unnecessary to decide with 
precision which was required because the 
detective easily had a high degree of certainty.  
[para. 157]
100%
 Certainty
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Justice Wakeling, Can v. Calgary (Police Service), 2014 ABCA 322
“A reasonable person with [the detective’s] experience and training and given the data on which the arrestor relied would have 
easily concluded with a high degree of certainty that [the plaintiff] had committed the indictable offences of extortion and forcible 
confinement.” [para. 162]
“After [the detective] completed his interview of ... the complainant’s wife, he had collected enough information to justify [the 
plaintiff’s] arrest under s. 495(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. The information he had in his possession would justify an objective 
observer concluding with a high degree of certainty – that it was more likely than not – that [the plaintiff] had committed indictable 
offences.” [para. 163]
“By the time [the detective] issued the arrest order, he had accumulated more than enough information to satisfy even the most 
cautious reasonable person that there was a high degree of certainty that [the plaintiff] had committed two indictable offences – 
extortion and forcible confinement.” [para. 166]
“There will be another occasion to resolve this issue when the arrestor, objectively assessed, cannot be adjudged to have had reason 
to believe that it is more likely than not that the arrestee had committed a crime. In such a case, Canadian jurists will have to 
determine with precision what the degree of certainty must be. How much certainty is required in a society which cherishes 
individual freedom and personal autonomy?” [para. 157]
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NO	 EVIDENCE	 RADAR	 UNIT	 
ACCURATE:	 
SPEEDING	 CHARGE	 DISMISSED
Abrametz v. Canada, 2014 SKCA 84             
    
A police officer saw a  motor vehicle 
moving  on a highway and visually 
assessed it traveling  at a speed greater 
than the 100  km/h posted limit. He 
used a radar unit 
which reported that the vehicle was 
traveling  at 135  km/h. The officer 
pulled the vehicle over and issued 
the driver a ticket for speeding  under 
s. 199(1)(b) of Saskatchewan’s Traffic 
Safety Act (TSA). 
          
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
 
The accused contested his speeding  ticket. 
The officer said that the accuracy of the 
radar unit had to be regularly checked by 
means of tuning  forks known to generate a 
prescribed frequency when struck. However, he also 
said that he had no direct knowledge of the tuning 
forks he used as having  been tested and therefore 
could not say they were vibrating  at the prescribed 
frequency. He also agreed that his testimony about 
the accuracy of the radar unit was contingent on him 
knowing  that the tuning  forks were vibrating  at the 
prescribed frequency. The Crown never filed a 
certificate pursuant to the TSA confirming  the tuning 
forks the officer used to determine the accuracy of 
the radar unit had been tested for accuracy. But the 
officer nonetheless said he believed the radar unit 
was accurate and he had used it many times. 
The accused asked the judge to dismiss the charge 
because  the accuracy of the radar unit was in doubt. 
He challenged the accuracy of the speed calculated 
by the radar unit on the ground that its accuracy 
cannot be established beyond a reasonable doubt in 
the absence of evidence that the tuning  forks used 
produced the prescribed frequency when struck. 
Therefore, in his view, the Crown had failed to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
accused’s vehicle was travelling  135  km/h when 
targeted by the  officer. The judge, however, 
concluded the lack of a certificate for the tuning 
forks, or the  officer not being  able to say that the 
subject tuning  forks were accurate, was not fatal to 
the prosecution. In the judge’s view, the officer was 
able to establish the accuracy of the radar unit by  its 
internal check  and his observations based on his 
training  and experience. The accused was found 
guilty of speeding  on the basis that he  had been 
travelling at 135 km/h.
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench 
The accused appealed his conviction 
arguing, in part, that the conviction was 
unreasonable because the officer admitted 
that the  absence of a tuning  fork 
certificate affected the  validity of his evidence about 
the reliability of the radar unit. The appeal judge 
disagreed stating:
BY THE BOOK:
Saskatchewan’s	 Traffic Safety Act
s. 258(2)   In a prosecution for a contravention 
of this Act, the regulations or a bylaw of a 
municipality, the following certificates are 
admissible in evidence as proof, in the absence 
of evidence to the contrary, of the facts stated 
in the certificate and of the authority of the person who 
issued and signed the certificate, without proof of his or her 
appointment or signature:
(a)        a certificate:
(i)   stating the result of a test of:
…
(B) a tuning fork identified in the certificate and used for
determining the accuracy of a radar set;
…
(E)      any other device identified in the certificate and used 
for or in connection with establishing the speed of vehicles;
(ii)  bearing a date:
(A) in the case of a tuning fork, not more than one year 
before or after the date of the offence charged;
…
(iii)           purporting to be signed by a prescribed tester to 
test devices of the type stated to have been tested; ...
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Whether the certificate was in the officer’s 
pocket or whether the officer was unable to 
locate the certificate at the detachment does not 
affect the validity of the officer’s evidence that 
he had used this radar detector between 300 
and 400 times without problem, that he had 
checked the radar detector with the internal 
check and the tuning forks both at the start of his 
shift and at the end of his shift and found it 
working properly. The evidence before the court 
as presented by a qualified radar detector 
technician is that it was working properly.
The speeding  conviction was upheld and the 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The accused again appealed 
contending, among  other things, 
that the officer’s testimony about 
knowing  whether the tuning  forks 
were generating  the prescribed frequency was 
essential to the validity  of his evidence rendered his 
conviction unreasonable. 
Justice Klebue, speaking  for the Court of Appeal, 
noted that “the radar unit in question is not an 
instrument whose  performance is deemed by 
legislation to be accurate.” He continued:
Thus a judge, when relying only on the results 
generated by a radar unit to ground a conviction 
for speeding, must be satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the results generated by 
the radar unit were accurate. This will involve, 
inter alia, being satisfied that the unit was 
working properly. In the instant case, the Crown 
did not file in evidence an s. 258(2)(a) certificate 
confirming  the accuracy of the tuning forks used 
by the officer. Nor did the officer have personal 
knowledge of whether his tuning forks were 
vibrating  at the required frequency at the 
relevant time. [para. 26]
In this case, there was no evidence that the tuning 
forks were tested, certified to be accurate under s. 
258(2), or otherwise generated the prescribed 
frequency when struck. Since the officer agreed at 
trial that it was “essential” to the validity of his 
evidence that the court know whether the tuning 
forks he used to test the radar unit were vibrating  at 
the proper frequency, the judge could not have 
reasonably arrived at a conclusion that the accused 
was driving  at 135 km/h. The accused’s appeal was 
allowed and his conviction was set aside. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
DEMAND	 TO	 BE	 MADE	 AS	 SOON	 
AS	 PRACTICABLE,	 NOT	 
FORTHWITH
R. v. Racine, 2014 SKCA 73                    
 
The police received a complaint 
from a motorist that a blue Ford 
Explorer was being  driven erratically 
and had driven through a red 
light.  The complainant drove to a 
service station and the Ford Explorer followed. A 
police officer attended the service  station and found 
a vehicle matching  the complainant’s vehicle as well 
as a  running  blue Ford Explorer with its driver’s door 
open, but no driver. The accused was near the 
complainant’s vehicle trying  to engage its 
occupants. When he saw the officer, he began to 
walk toward the Explorer. The officer asked the 
accused if he was the driver of the Explorer but he 
replied that he did not know who owned it.  The 
officer then asked the driver of the complainant’s 
vehicle whether this was “the guy”. This person said, 
“Yes, that’s him”. 
The officer told the accused he would have to go to 
the police cruiser for the purpose of an impaired 
driving  investigation. During  this interaction, the 
officer noted the accused had an odour of liquor on 
his breath, slurred speech and red and glazed eyes.  
He had difficulty answering  questions, swayed while 
walking  to the police vehicle and some of his 
sentences did not make sense.  Based on his 
observations and the information provided by the 
driver of the complainant’s vehicle and the 
dispatcher, the officer opined that the accused was 
the operator of the Explorer referred to in the call 
and was intoxicated. The accused was arrested for 
impaired driving  and a breath demand was made. 
The demand occurred 13 minutes after the officer 
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arrived at the service station, made his observations, 
and confirmed his belief that the accused was the 
driver. Subsequent investigation revealed the 
accused had provided a false name and the Explorer 
was stolen.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The trial judge concluded, among  other 
things, that the accused was the driver of 
the Ford Explorer being  driven erratically 
and ruled that the officer had the 
necessary  grounds to make the breath demand. He 
also found that the demand was properly given. The 
accused was convicted of refusing  to provide breath 
samples and obstructing  a police officer by lying 
about his name. He was sentenced to 352 days in 
jail and given a five year driving ban. 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The accused challenged the trial 
judge’s determination of whether the 
officer had reasonable grounds to 
make the breath demand. He also 
argued that the demand for the breath sample was 
not made “forthwith.”
Reasonable Grounds
The accused contended that the trial judge failed to 
apply the correct legal standard - a  balance of 
probabilities - when determining  whether the officer 
had reasonable and probable  grounds for the breath 
demand. Instead, he suggested a lesser standard was 
applied. Justice Ottenbreit, delivering  the Court of 
Appeal’s decision, however disagreed. “The standard 
of ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ simply requires 
the trial judge to determine  whether the officer had a 
subjective belief of impairment and whether the 
factors articulated by the officer for such belief were 
reliable  and capable of objectively supporting  that 
belief on all the evidence,” he said. In this case, he 
concluded that the trial judge was correct in her 
assessment, both as to the test for reasonable 
grounds and her application of it:
There was ample evidence to support both 
subjective and objective grounds for the officer’s 
belief that [the accused] was impaired. The 
officer’s personal observations that [the accused] 
smelled like alcohol, his eyes were red and 
glazed, he swayed when he walked, he slurred 
his speech when speaking, he was not 
responsive to questions, he looked and acted 
like he was intoxicated and refused to answer 
any questions about whether he had been 
drinking all provide cogent objective and 
subjective grounds for making the breath 
demand.  Added to these grounds is the 
information that the officer had received from 
the dispatcher respecting  the behaviour of [the 
accused’s] vehicle as reported by [the 
complainant]. The trial judge did not err in 
finding that the officer had subjective and 
objective reasonable and probable grounds for 
the demand.  [para. 15]
BY THE BOOK:
Warrantless	 Arrest: Criminal Code
s. 254(3)  If a peace officer has reasonable 
grounds to believe that a person is committing, 
or at any time within the preceding three 
hours has committed, an offence under section 
253 as a result of the consumption of alcohol, the peace 
officer may, by demand made as soon as practicable, require 
the person
(a) to provide, as soon as practicable,
 (i) samples of breath
“The standard of ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ simply requires the trial judge to 
determine whether the officer had a subjective belief of impairment and whether the 
factors articulated by the officer for such belief were reliable and capable of objectively 
supporting that belief on all the evidence.”
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Forthwith
Under s. 254(3)  of the Criminal Code, the  demand 
for breath samples does not need to be made 
forthwith. Rather, the demand needs to be made as 
soon as practicable. In this case, as Justice Ottenbriet 
noted, “the officer made the demand approximately 
13  minutes after he arrived, as soon as he came to 
believe that [the  accused] had operated the Ford 
Explorer while his ability to do so was impaired.”
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
CROWN	 BEARS	 BURDEN	 OF	 
DEMONSTRATING	 ACCESS	 NOT	 
REASONABLY	 FEASIBLE
R. v. Taylor, 2014 SCC 50
 
In the early  morning  hours, the 
accused attempted to make a turn 
while driving  at high speed, hit a 
street lamp and rolled his vehicle. 
Three of his passengers were injured. 
Following  the  on scene investigation, the  accused 
was subsequently arrested for impaired driving 
causing  bodily  harm, read his Charter right to 
counsel and told he would be provided with a 
telephone if he wanted to call a lawyer. He said he 
wanted to talk to his father and his lawyer. A 
paramedic on scene determined there was nothing 
wrong  with the accused but, out of an abundance of 
caution, talked him into being  transported by 
ambulance to the hospital for examination by a 
physician.
 
After being  admitted to the hospital, the accused 
waited in the hospital hallway and was later moved 
to a bed for examination. Police were also present. 
Five vials of blood were taken by hospital staff and 
sent to the hospital lab for analysis, a procedure the 
police tracked. The investigating  officer, after 
learning  it was unknown when the accused would 
be released, gave the  blood demand and samples 
were drawn for that purpose. At no time while at the 
hospital did the police afford the accused an 
opportunity to contact counsel. The following  day 
the police obtained a  warrant to seize the  hospital 
blood for evidentiary purposes and sent it off for 
analysis. Both the  hospital samples and police 
demand samples were  analyzed and provided 
readings in excess of the legal limit. 
 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench  
 
The investigating  officer testified that he 
made a mistake in not making  his 
personal cell phone available. As well, he 
admitted he would have and could have 
provided an opportunity for the accused to speak to 
a lawyer at the hospital had he remembered to do 
so. The judge accepted a Crown concession that the 
police breached the accused’s s. 10(b) Charter  rights 
with respect to the police demanded samples 
because  an opportunity  to speak with with counsel 
prior to the demand being  made was not provided. 
But he agreed with the Crown that there was no s. 
10(b) prior to the hospital samples being  taken. He 
concluded that no phone needed to be provided at 
the accident scene, nor was there a reasonable 
opportunity to provide private access to counsel 
while the accused was waiting  or receiving  medical 
treatment at the hospital. The hospital blood samples 
were admitted as evidence and the accused was 
convicted of three impaired driving  causing  bodily 
harm counts. 
 
Alberta Court of Appeal
 
Th e a c c u s e d a p p e a l e d , 
submitting  that the trial judge 
erred in not finding  a Charter 
breach when the officer failed 
to facilitate access to counsel. Justices Berger and 
O’Brien agreed, holding  that the officer could have 
made his own cell phone available to the accused at 
the accident scene or in the hospital. Without the 
benefit of legal advice before the hospital blood 
draw, the accused was unable to exercise a 
meaningful and informed choice about whether he 
should consent to the hospital samples being  taken. 
The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the 
Charter, the accused’s appeal was allowed, his 
conviction quashed and an acquittal was entered. 
Justice Slatter, authoring  a dissenting  opinion, found 
there was no s. 10(b)  breach because the 
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circumstances at the accident scene and at the 
hospital precluded a reasonable opportunity to 
facilitate contact with counsel. 
Supreme Court of Canada
The Crown appealed the 
finding  of the s. 10(b) 
Charter breach and the 
setting  aside of the accused’s 
acquittal. It was the Crown’s 
position that the police  had 
properly complied with the 
right to counsel as guaranteed under s. 10(b). 
Justice Abella, writing  the five member Supreme 
Court opinion, outlined the police duty in facilitating 
a detainee's right to counsel: 
The duty to inform a detained person of his or 
her right to counsel arises “immediately” upon 
arrest or detention, and the duty to facilitate 
access to a lawyer, in turn, arises immediately 
upon the detainee’s request to speak to 
counsel. The arresting officer is therefore under a 
constitutional obligation to facilitate the 
requested access to a lawyer at the first 
reasonably available opportunity. The burden is 
on the Crown to show that a given delay was 
reasonable in the circumstances.  Whether a 
delay in facilitating access to counsel is 
reasonable is a factual inquiry.
This means that to give effect to the right to 
counsel, the police must inform detainees of 
their s. 10(b) rights and facilitate access to those 
rights where requested, both without delay. This 
includes “allowing  [the detainee] upon his 
request to use the telephone for that purpose if 
one is available”. And all this because the 
detainee is in the control of the police and 
cannot exercise his right to counsel unless the 
police give him a reasonable opportunity to do 
so.
Until the requested access to counsel is 
provided, it is uncontroversial that there is an 
obligation on the police to refrain from taking 
f u r t h e r i n v e s t i g a t i v e s t e p s t o e l i c i t 
evidence. [references omitted, paras. 24-26]
Justice Abella went on to find that the accused’s s. 
10(b) rights had been clearly breached in this case 
because  the police failed to provide him with access 
to counsel at the first reasonable opportunity. The 
investigating  officer testified he  would have and 
could have provided access to a lawyer had he 
remembered. He never said there were any logistical 
or medical obstacles to providing  access such as a 
medical emergency, the absence of a phone, or even 
problems with providing  sufficient privacy. Nor were 
there  any urgent or dangerous circumstances that 
could have limited the officer’s implementational 
duties. There was nothing  wrong  with the accused 
and he was only taken to the hospital as a 
precaution. During  the delay while waiting  to see a 
doctor (some 20 to 30 minutes), the police could 
have made inquiries as to whether a phone was 
available or whether one was medically feasible. But 
no such inquiries were made by police.
“The duty of the police is to provide access to 
counsel at the earliest practical opportunity,” said 
Justice Abella. “To suggest ... that it is presumptively 
reasonable to delay the implementation of the right 
to counsel for the entire duration of an accused’s 
R. v. Taylor Timeline
1:25 am - Accident
1:31 am - Police on scene
1:41 am - Arrest
1:43 am - s. 10(b) Charter given
2:19 am - En-route to hospital
2:43 am - Arrive at hospital
3:05 > 3:12 am - Hospital blood draw
3:13 am - Blood demand
4:53 am - Blood draw pursuant to demand
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time waiting  for and receiving  medical treatment in 
a hospital emergency ward, without any evidence of 
the  particular circumstances, undermines the 
constitutional requirement of access to counsel 
‘without delay’.” She continued:
Not everything that happens in an emergency 
ward is necessarily a medical emergency of such 
proportions that communication between a 
lawyer and an accused is not reasonably 
possible.  Constitutional rights cannot be 
displaced by assumptions of impracticality.  
Barriers to access must be proven, not assumed, 
and proactive steps are required to turn the right 
to counsel into access to counsel.
An individual who enters a hospital to receive 
medical treatment is not in a Charter-free zone.  
Where the individual has requested access to 
counsel and is in custody at the hospital, the 
police have an obligation under s. 10(b) to take 
steps to ascertain whether private access to a 
phone is in fact avai lable, g iven the 
circumstances. Since most hospitals have 
phones, it is not a question simply of whether 
the individual is in the emergency room, it is 
whether the Crown has demonstrated that the 
circumstances are such that a private phone 
conversation is not reasonably feasible.
The result of the officers’ failure to even turn 
their minds that night to the obligation to 
provide this access, meant that there was 
virtually no evidence about whether a private 
phone call would have been possible, and 
t he r e fo r e no ba s i s f o r a s s e s s i ng t he 
reasonableness of the failure to facilitate access.  
In fact, this is a case not so much about delay in 
facilitating access, but about its complete denial.  
It is difficult to see how this ongoing  failure can 
be characterized as reasonable. [paras. 33-35]
In short, the  police  did not take any steps to facilitate 
the accused’s access to counsel before the first set of 
blood samples were taken. The evidence was 
inadmissible under s. 24(2), the Crown’s appeal was 
dismissed and the accused’s acquittal upheld. 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
Commentary: Use of Police Cell Phone
Must a police officer who has 
their own cell  phone with 
them  use it to provide  an 
arrestee access to counsel? 
The trial judge didn’t think so, 
concluding  that the police did 
not have an obligation to 
provide their own cell phone 
to a  detained person. But a 
majority of the Alberta Court of 
Appeal thought so. It found 
that the officer’s mistake in not 
providing  his own cell phone, after acknowledging 
that he could have provided it, gave rise to a s. 10(b) 
breach. 
In a short discussion of this issue, Justice Abella said, 
“in light of privacy  and safety issues, the police are 
under no legal duty to provide their own cell phone 
to a detained individual.” But, she also ruled, “the 
police nonetheless have both a duty to provide 
phone access as soon as practicable to reduce the 
possibility of accidental self-incrimination and to 
refrain from eliciting  evidence from the individual 
before access to counsel has been facilitated. While 
s. 10(b) does not create a “right” to use a  specific 
phone, it does guarantee that the individual will 
have access to a  phone to exercise his right to 
counsel at the first reasonable opportunity.”
“The duty to inform a detained person of his or her right to counsel arises “immediately” 
upon arrest or detention, and the duty to facilitate access to a lawyer, in turn, arises 
immediately upon the detainee’s request to speak to counsel. The arresting officer is 
therefore under a constitutional obligation to facilitate the requested access to a lawyer 
at the first reasonably available opportunity.”
“An individual who enters a hospital to 
receive medical treatment is not in a 
Charter-free zone.”  
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POLICE	 ACTED	 IN	 GOOD	 FAITH:
EVIDENCE	 ADMISSIBLE
R. v. Johnston, 2014 ONCA 704
The accused amassed a hotel bill in 
excess of $20,000 while  staying  for 
56  days at a  luxury hotel catering  to 
business executives requiring  long-
term accommodation. After making 
numerous unsuccessful attempts for payment, the 
hotel finally  received a cheque for slightly  more than 
$20,000. When the bank didn’t honour this cheque, 
the accused was told the hotel would need a 
minimum payment of $5,000 or he would be 
required to vacate immediately.  He then gave the 
hotel only $500 in cash. The manager, believing  the 
hotel was being  defrauded, called police. She said 
the accused had an armed bodyguard, who was a 
former RCMP  officer.  Police  attended, knocked on 
the accused’s hotel room door but no one 
responded.  When they police attended an 
alternative exit to the room, they saw the accused 
leaving  and placed him in handcuffs due to a 
concern about the presence of a firearm.  Police 
entered the hotel room, without a warrant, to check 
for an armed person. No one was found in the  room 
but they saw a computer, a blackberry, memory 
sticks, a printer, files containing  blank cheques, and 
various documents. The police seized these items 
and searched them after obtaining  a search warrant. 
The accused was also arrested and allowed to speak 
to a lawyer by telephone in the  room. He was 
subsequently  charged with uttering  a  forged 
document, fraud over $5,000, and three counts of 
breaching a recognizance.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused claimed that his rights 
guaranteed by s. 8  of the Charter were 
violated by the warrantless search of his 
hotel room, and he sought an order under 
s. 24(2)  excluding  the evidence seized by police. 
The judge held the warrantless search did breach s. 
8  but did not exclude the evidence. First, the 
seriousness of the  Charter-infringing  state conduct 
favoured admission. The police were acting  in good 
faith. They were responding  to a call about evicting 
a guest with an armed bodyguard and entered the 
room to conduct a cursory search to determine 
whether an armed person was present. The items 
were in plain view and police later obtained a 
search warrant to search them. They were courteous 
to the accused and facilitated his right to counsel in 
private. Second, The impact of the state  conduct on 
the accused’s Charter-protected interests only 
“somewhat” favoured exclusion. Although he  had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room, 
it was reduced because  he knew he was facing 
imminent eviction. Finally, society’s interest in an 
adjudication of the case on its merits favoured 
admission. The evidence was reliable and integral to 
the Crown’s case. In the judge’s view, the admission 
of the evidence would not bring  the administration 
of justice into disrepute. The accused was convicted 
of fraud, uttering  a forged document and three 
counts of breach of recognizance. He was sentenced 
to four years in prison. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
Th e a c c u s e d a p p e a l e d h i s 
conviction arguing  the trial judge 
erred in her s. 24(2)  analysis. The 
Court of Appeal, however, found the 
trial judge  did not err. She considered the correct 
legal principles and her findings of fact that she 
relied upon were open to her to make. The accused’s 
appeal against his conviction was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
BACK-UP	 OFFICER’s	 EVIDENCE	 
SERVED	 AS	 CORROBORATION
R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali, 2014 ONCA 627
The accused was driving  along  a 
busy street in the curb lane followed 
by a marked police car in the 
passing  lane about two car-lengths 
behind. The windows of the police 
car were open and the officer detected a very strong 
odour of marijuana coming  from the accused’s car. 
He pulled up on the driver’s side and saw the driver 
smoking  a hand rolled cigarette held in a thumb-
and-forefinger, palm forward grip  associated with 
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marijuana. The man immediately 
removed the cigarette from his mouth, 
moved it down in front of his body and 
stared straight ahead. The officer pulled 
t h e c a r ove r a n d s m e l l e d a n 
overwhelming  odour of freshly burnt 
marijuana on approaching  it. He asked 
the accused to get out of the car, 
arrested him for possessing  marijuana and advised 
him of his right to counsel. When the accused was 
searched a loaded 22 calibre pistol was discovered. 
A backup  officer arrived to assist and he also 
smelled an odour of burnt marihuana when he 
opened the passenger door of the car. He also saw a 
half-burnt and apparently recently-smoked 
marijuana roach between the seat as it was being 
discovered by the arresting  officer. The accused was 
charged with possessing  marijuana and several 
firearms-related offences, including  possession of a 
loaded prohibited firearm, careless storage of a 
firearm and possession of a  firearm while  prohibited 
from doing so.
Ontario Court of Justice
The accused contended that his rights 
under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter had been 
violated. He wanted the  loaded handgun 
found in his possession excluded as 
evidence. The judge had difficulty with the officer’s 
evidence that he was able to trace the marijuana 
odour to the accused’s car and that he saw him 
smoking  a marijuana joint based on its hand-rolled 
appearance and the manner in which it was held. 
Both of these observations, purportedly occurring 
while travelling  at 60 km/h, made the trial judge 
uneasy. However, the judge found it was “more 
likely that the manner in which the cigarette was 
smoked alone  confirmed the hunch that the content 
was marijuana and not tobacco.” He accepted that 
the “thumb-and-index-finger, palm-forward grip” 
described by the officer was a reasonable sign of 
marihuana smoking, even though it might not be 
exclusive to it. Further, the officer’s evidence was 
corroborated by his backup who saw the recently-
smoked roach in the car and smelled the strong 
odour of freshly-burnt marijuana. “On the evidence 
as a  whole, I find it likely  that [the  officer] smelled a 
burning  joint while driving  behind the defendant,” 
the judge concluded. “He investigated 
his hunch that the smell originated from 
the defendant’s vehicle by pulling  up 
beside it. [He] then observed him 
smoking  in the manner usually used with 
marijuana joints.” The traffic stop was an 
appropriate exercise  of police authority 
and there were no Charter  breaches. The 
arrest was lawful as was the search incidental to it. 
The accused was convicted of drug  and firearms 
offences, and sentenced to six  years in prison, less 
pre-sentence custody. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
T h e a c c u s e d a p p e a l e d h i s 
convictions, claiming  (among  other 
things) that he was unlawfully 
detained contrary to s. 9 of the 
Charter. He suggested that the trial judge erred in 
using  the  back-up officer’s evidence as after-the-fact 
justification for his detention. Further, he  argued the 
judge erred in taking  judicial notice of the manner in 
which he was holding  the cigarette as characteristic 
of marijuana smoking.
Justice Starthy, writing  the Court of Appeal’s opinion, 
did not consider the back-up officer’s evidence as 
after-the-fact justification for the detention. It was 
merely corroborative. The back-up officer confirmed 
there  was an odour of marijuana in the car as well 
as a recently-smoked joint. This evidence “served to 
corroborate [the arresting  officer’s] evidence that: 
there was a strong  odour of freshly-smoked 
marijuana in the vehicle; he had observed [the 
accused] smoking  something  in a manner consistent 
with marijuana; and [the accused] had attempted to 
hide the item when the police cruiser pulled up 
beside him.”
Justice Starthy also concluded that the trial judge did 
not base his decision on judicial notice. 
In describing  the circumstances that led to his 
decision to stop [the accused’s] vehicle, [the 
arresting] referred not only to his observation of 
the smell of marijuana, but also to the fact that 
[the accused] was smoking; that he was holding 
the object between his right thumb and index 
finger and smoking  it from his lips; that he 
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observed a puff of smoke from [the accused’s] 
mouth; and that when [the accused] saw him, he 
removed the cigarette from his mouth, lowered it 
out of sight and started staring  straight ahead. It 
is apparent that the manner in which [the 
accused] was holding the joint was simply one 
of several circumstances that informed the 
officer’s decision to detain him.
The accused had not been unlawfully detained and, 
as conceded, the  search conducted was incidental to 
arrest. The appeal against his conviction was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
15-007
Online Graduate  
Certi!cate Programs
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS 
TACTICAL CRIMINAL ANALYSIS
Expand your credentials and advance your career with 
these online graduate certi!cates. Learn through real world 
challenges, current cases, curriculum and techniques. 
Gain the specialized theoretical foundation and applied skills 
to function successfully as an analyst.
604.528.5843 JIBC.ca/graduatestudies
715 McBride Boulevard, New Westminster, BC
